




(Casper, Dfinity, Hotstuff, Pili, Pala...)

Streamlet:


Textbook streamlined blockchain protocols

Elaine Shi
Cornell

Joint work with Benjamin Chan

Blockchain

(a.k.a. state machine replication, consensus)



Blockchain


(a.k.a. state machine replication, consensus)

Consistency:

Honest nodes agree on log

Liveness:

TXs are incorporated soon



Blockchain: A 30-year-old Problem

YAHOO!

facebook



Solr




UBER

ebay



**Cryptocurrencies brought consensus
to a large scale**



Proof of work




**Enables permissionless
consensus**

Proof of work



Proof of work




Proof of stake



parity

Rely on **permissioned**
consensus

Proof of work



Proof of stake



Blockchain

Every round t , node i outputs *longest* **final** log denoted LOG_i^t

► **Consistency**: for any honest i, j , and t, t' ,

$$\text{LOG}_i^t < \text{LOG}_j^{t'} \quad \text{or} \quad \text{LOG}_j^{t'} < \text{LOG}_i^t$$

Holds for $1 - \text{negl}$ probability over the choice of execution

Blockchain

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$$\text{LOG}_i^t < \text{LOG}_j^{t'} \quad \text{or} \quad \text{LOG}_j^{t'} < \text{LOG}_i^t$$

► **Liveness:** if an honest node receives input tx in round t , then in round $t + T(\lambda, n, \Delta)$, any honest node has tx in its LOG

Holds for $1 - \text{negl}$ probability over the choice of execution

Blockchain



Single-shot consensus

In PKI setting, equivalent to **BA** from a feasibility perspective

Blockchain

In PKI setting, equivalent to **BA** from a feasibility perspective



Is blockchain a meaningful abstraction?

Blockchain: 2 approaches

PODC, CRYPTO community

Sequential composition of BA

SOSP, NDSI, real-world community

Direct blockchain construction
(e.g., pbft, paxos)

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
Roadmap



Classical approaches
(e.g., pbft, paxos)


Streamlet: a streamlined
blockchain

Block Format






1 Proposer proposes block




2 Vote




3


Confirm  upon $\frac{2}{3}n$ votes




$\frac{2}{3} n$ votes: notarization



Honest nodes vote **uniquely** each height




Must intersect at an honest node



Assume: $< \frac{1}{3}n$ corrupt

Must intersect at an honest node



Thus  = 

$\frac{2}{3}$ honest

Consistency

honest




Liveness


$\frac{2}{3}$ honest

Consistency


Liveness



How do we achieve liveness?



Anatomy of classical consensus



**Simple normal
path**

**Complicated
recovery path**



Can we achieve full consensus
(almost) as easily as the normal path?


Roadmap



Classical approaches
(e.g., pbft, paxos)

Streamlined blockchains
(Casper, Dfinity, Hotstuff, Pili, Pala, **Streamlet**)

Assume: epoch = 1 sec $\geq$ 1 roundtrip



Proposer rotation

Node $H(i) \bmod n$ is the proposer in epoch i

Easy to support any other proposer-rotation policy

If everyone were honest




Life
is good


Real world

1


can skip epochs



Real world



Height = “position in chain”



► **Propose**

- extend longest notarized chain

► **Vote**

- no double-vote each epoch
- verify parent block notarized
- no conflicting notar at the height

} **Every
epoch**

- **Finalization**: height **h** final if heights **$h-1$** , **h** , **$h+1$** have **consecutive epochs** & are notarized





This talk


1


Consistency Proof

2

Liveness Proof


- Finalization: height h final if heights $h-1$, h , $h+1$ have consecutive epochs & are notarized







Case 1

Case 2



Lemma: every epoch has at most 1 notarized block.






Proof:

“many” = at least $n/3$ honest

many voted for 8 in epoch 8






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
many voted for 8 in epoch 8
--> many saw 7 notarized in epoch 8



Proof:

"many" = at least $n/3$ honest


- many voted for 8 in epoch 8
- > many saw 7 notarized in epoch 8
- > they will not vote for 9 in epoch 9



Proof:

"many" = at least $n/3$ honest

- many voted for 8 in epoch 8
- > many saw 7 notarized in epoch 8
- > they will not vote for 9 in epoch 9
- > 9 cannot gain notarization



Case 1


Case 2



“many” = at least $n/3$ honest

Proof:

many voted for 5 in epoch 5




Height $h-1$

“many” = at least $n/3$ honest

Proof:

many voted for 5 in epoch 5
--> many saw 3 notarized in epoch 5




Height $h-1$

“many” = at least $n/3$ honest

Proof:


- many voted for 5 in epoch 5
- > many saw 3 notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for 6 in epoch 6



“many” = at least $n/3$ honest

Proof:


- many voted for 5 in epoch 5
- > many saw 3 notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for 6 in epoch 6
- > 6 cannot gain notarization



“many” = at least $n/3$ honest

Proof:

- many voted for 5 in epoch 5
- > many saw 3 notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for 6 in epoch 6
- > 6 cannot gain notarization



Height $h-1$

“many” = at least $n/3$ honest

Proof:

- many voted for  in epoch 5
- > many saw  notarized in epoch 5
- > they will not vote for  in epoch 6
- >  cannot gain notarization



Consistency does not depend on
sync. assumptions!



Liveness Theorem

During a **period of synchrony**, honest nodes' finalized chains grow whenever **5** consecutive epochs have honest proposers.

(and moreover the finalized chains grow by **honest blocks**)

Partial Synchrony

[DLS]

- ▶ Protocol knows a delay estimate Δ
- ▶ **Consistency** is guaranteed even if actual delay **arbitrarily long**
- ▶ **Liveness** only during **periods of synchrony**

Partial Synchrony

[DLS]

Theorem:

Cannot tolerate $\frac{1}{3}$ or more
corruptions

Summary: streamlined blockchains

- ▶ Every epoch allows proposer-switch.
- ▶ View change embedded in a unified “propose-vote” paradigm.



Roadmap

$\frac{1}{2}$ synchronous

$\frac{1}{3}$ partially synchronous

Every epoch:

- Proposer proposes a block extending longest notarized chain
- Vote on the first proposal if parent notarized and no other notarized block at same height
- A block with **majority** votes is **notarized**

Finalization:

- 6 consecutive at the end, **no conflicting notarization**, chop off 5



Optimistic
Responsiveness

Best-possible
partition
tolerance

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/981>

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/980>

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/179>



Thank You!

elaine@cs.cornell.edu